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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CHARLES E. RICHMOND, Executor of
the Estate of WILLIAM B. OUTCALT,
Deceased,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

I

t

Case No.

1

VS.

IVIE W. BALLARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

8755

l
I

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As a reply to the respondent's Petition for Rehearing, we
set forth herein a concise answer to the points raised. A more
complete answer may be found in the appellant's Brief heretofore filed and in the opinion of this court.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
MRS. BALLARD'S TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO
EXECUTION OF THE DEED IS COMPETENT.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD COMPELS THE
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THIS COURT.
POINT III.
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT REFLECTS ONLY
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSIONS COMPELLED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV.
NEITHER WIGMORE NOR ANY OTHER AUTHORITY WOULD ADMIT EXHIBIT 11.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
I\!RS. BALLARD'S TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO
EXECUTION OF THE DEED IS COMPETENT.
Counsel for respondent admit that Mrs. Ballard's testimony
,., as properly received yet they complain because the court has
given credence to it. At page 4 of respondent's petition it is
stated:
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"The trial court properly admitted and heard ~11 the
evidence on both sides of the case."
.~[

~:

Counsel's position is a paradox. On the one hand they
state the testimony was properly received and on the other
hand it is urged that it is not entitled to consideration. Plaintiff agrees that he waived the incompetency of Mrs. Ballard
to testify with regard to circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed. He is certainly in no position, and we do not
understand him to argue, that the incompetent exhibit proffered
by him and received by the court did not effect a waiver. The
offer and admission of evidence, whether competent or not,
which it is claimed relates to a privileged transaction constitutes a waiver of the statute, just as would a failure to object.
Anderson v. Anderson, 136 Wis. 328, 117 N.W. 807.
There was a waiver of the statute by the offer and admission of Exhibit 11. There was also a waiver by plaintiff's
examination of Mrs. Ballard as an adverse witness. Respondent's counsel by their questioning of Mrs. Ballard elicited part
of the contract made between Mrs. Ballard and the deceased
(R. 183-185). This opened the door to proof as to modification
of said contract by execution of the deed. Whether the waiver
was effected by Exhibit 11 or by the examination of Mrs.
Ballard or by both is of little consequence, ho·wever. There
being a waiver of her disqualification, her testimony is entitled
to the same credence as that of other witnesses. It is an established principle of law that:
"Where there is a waiver of the incompetency of the
witness to testify as to transactions or communications
with decedent, such testimony has probative force,
cannot be disregarded, requires no corroboration before

5
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it can be credited, and is to be weighed as other testimony." 97 C.J.S. 737.
See also Boeltcher v. Busse, 45 Wash. 2d 579, 277
P. 2d 368; Farias v. Salas, 244 S. W. 1115; In re Schaefer's Estate, 261 Wis. 431, 53 N.W. 2d 427.
But suppose that there had been no waiver and that Mrs.
Ballard was therefore disqualified from testifying as to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed. How
would this affect the evidence? Respondent has not alleged
nor has he introduced a scintilla of evidence to prove that
the deed was not executed and delivered by Outcalt. The
genuineness of the document is unchallenged. Further, there
is not only a total failure of proof of undue influence, but
the independent testimony of several impartial witnesses, as
pointed out by the court, conclusively refute that allegation.

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD COMPELS THE
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THIS COURT.
Point 2 of respondent's Petition for Rehearing begins
with the following sentence:
"The trial court did not belieYe Mrs. Ballard's version of the manner in which the deed was obtained,
and there is ample reason for such determination."
Although counsel state there is "ample reason" for disbelieving
l\1rs. Ballard's account of the execution of the deed, they have
not ch~..)sen to state to this court one single reason in support
nf this bro~td claim. Instead of bolstering their own case, they
have attempted to select, isolate and discredit portions of the
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opinion of this court. The fact that one and one-half pages
of the petition are devoted to a vain attempt to show that the
court erred in hinting at the intent and motives of the Richmonds demonstrates the complete inability of counsel to point
to evidence in support of the trial court's judgment.
Counsel complain bitterly because some weight has been
given to the December codicil as reflecting the agreement of
Outcalt to leave his property to the defendant. This agreement
was not only established by testimony elicited by plaintiffs
counsel themselves but Outcalt's intentions were clearly established by the independent testimony of his neighbors, the
Taylors (R. 200-202, 250-259). Plaintiff's petition does not
tell us why the court should ignore the December codicil and
the events leading up to it. The court gave credence to this
evidence because it was established as factual without dispute
and by the uncontradicted testimony of several witnesses.
It is urged by respondent that the court should be suspicious
because Outcalt did not tell the world that he had given Mrs.
Ballard a deed. This feeble attempt to cast doubt on the execution of the deed is completely obliterated by the undisputed
fact that Outcalt did not choose to disclose to the Richmonds
and the McConnells either the contract, the December codicil
or the olographic will. Why should his private affairs be as an
open book to these people?
The opinion of this court reflects a painstaking review
of the record and a careful analysis of the facts. Plaintiff's
counsel have failed to point to a single sentence in the fifteen
page opinion which indicates a departure from or a distortion
of the evidence as contained in the record, nor have they sug7
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gested any pertinent evidence which has not been fully
considered and dealt with.

POINT III.
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT REFLECTS ONLY
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSIONS COMPELLED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
Irrespective of the regard which Dr. Marshall and Mrs.
Romney had for Mr. Outcalt, it is simply inescapable from the
undisputed evidence th.at he double-crossed Mrs. Ballard.
Counsel have not attempted nor are they able from the record
to show that the execution of the olographic will was anything
but an unmitigated act of deceit. Likewise the preparation of
Exhibit 11 is susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation.
It is unfortunate that the evidence which indicates the character
of the acts performed by the decedent must be published for
all the world to read but this cannot be laid at the door of
the court or of the defendant for it was the choice of plaintiff
and his counsel to exact the last pound of flesh in attempting
to deprive Mrs. Ballard of the fruits of her labor.
Respondent's counsel have lost track of the fact that it is
this court's prerogative and duty to weigh the evidence in
the rccorJ in order to determine where the preponderance lies.
It is urged again and again that there was opportunity and
reason for suspicion, ~·et there is no evidence either direct or
cirL'umstantial tending to prove the exercise of undue influence.
railing in their proof to show undue influence counsel argue
that it must be presumed that Mrs. Ballard exercised undue
8
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influence because she was Outcalt's housekeeper. In support
of this proposition the case of Omega Investment Company v.
Woolley is cited. Counsel fail to mention that the relationship
of attorney-client was involved in that case. Their argument
on presumptions is completely answered by the green sheet
opinion of the court and by the authorities cited at pages 51
to 54 of the Brief of Appellant. In any event this could not
be controlling for the defendant's evidence was more than
ample to eliminate the effect of any presumption and by no
stretch of the imagination could it be said that plaintiff's
evidence was "clear and convincing."

POINT IV.
NEITHER WIGMORE NOR ANY OTHER AUTHORITY WOULD ADMIT EXHIBIT 11.
The opinion of this court holds Exhibit 11 incompetent
for multiple reasons. Namely, ( 1) it is irrelevant, ( 2) it
violates the opinion rule, and ( 3) it is self-serving and hearsay.
Referring to the exhibit the green sheet opinion states:
" . . . It does not purport to relate to the deed or
any deed. It does not say that any paper was signed
under undue pressure. It does not refer to any specific
transaction, it does not specify or refer to any definite
time, place, circumstance or person. It has no probative
value in proving the fact of undue influence, unless we
use it, in violation of the Hearsay rule to show the
ultimate fact that other papers may have been signed
by him and we guess and single out the deed, Exhibit
1, as one of the papers he had in mind, if he had any
in mind."

9
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The Petition for Rehearing completely ignores the fact
that the exhibit is irrelevant and in violation of the opinion
rule. No attempt has been made either in respondent's Brief
or in the Petition for Rehearing to justify admission of the
exhibit in view of these rules of evidence. Instead counsel
urges that the exhibit is not hearsay and for that reason should
be held admissible and given weight. This, of course, is in
utter disregard of the careful consideration given by this court
to the several objections made to admission of the exhibit.
But it is clear that the exhibit is just as squarely opposed to
the hearsay rule as it is to the other mentioned rules.
The portion of Wigmore's text quoted by the court fully
sustains the proposition that Exhibit 11 is hearsay for the
purpose for which respondent's counsel offered it. Notwithstanding the fact that the exhibit was signed more than two
months subsequent to the execution of the deed, counsel now
contend that the exhibit is competent to show the deceased's
mental condition. Their argument, however, fails to consider
the inescapable conclusions reached by this court and reflected
in the following language of the opinion:
"Decedent's declaration in Exhibit 11 has no relevancy to the issues unless his declaration is true. As
so considered it strikes squarely at the hearsay rule
. . . The letter does not disclose the grantor's state
of mind as to the grantee . . . . He is not disclosing
his mental attitude toward her. Conceded that a statement, oral or in a letter, made by decedent at a time
not too remote that reflected his mental attitude toward
the grantee or evidenced his view of her intent is admissible.... Statements of the grantor tending to show
that his mind could be easily influenced and that another person dominated him or attempted to dominate
10
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him are, under proper conditions, admissible for the
purpose of showing the condition of his mind at the
time he made the statement, but the naked statement
of a conclusion that grantor was 'unduly pressured'
is inadmissible because it goes solely to prove the ultimate fact, and, does not go to the condition of the
grantor's mind at the time of utterance.''
In addition to being an irrelevant, self-serving hearsay
conclusion of the decedent, the exhibit is squarely opposed to
the criteria for admissibility set forth in the Mower case.
Although counsel contend that these criteria go to the weight
of the evidence only, it is clear from a careful reading of the
decision that unless the declarations are made fairly and in
the ordinary course of life and not in apparent anticipation of
litigation, they should not be admitted.
CONCLUSION
The court has committed no error in its application of the
law to the facts. The decision reflects the fair and equitable
result which the facts of the case require. The Petition for
Rehearing is merely a re-hash of issues already correctly
decided by this court in its painstaking review of the record.
\vie respectfully submit that the Petition for Rehearing should
be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE
GRANT .MACFARLANE, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

Suite 300, 65 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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